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The Limits of Liberal Humanitarianism in Europe: 
The ÔResponsibility to ProtectÕ and Forced Migration 
 
Edward Newman 
University of Leeds, UK 
 
Abstract 
 
This article explores the response of Europe to the refugee ÔcrisisÕ since 2015 and considers if 
this is a reasonable test of the regionÕs commitment to international humanitarianism and the 
ÔResponsibility to ProtectÕ principle (R2P). This response is explored both in terms of policy 
decisions and the political discourse used to frame the nature of the challenge, which weighs 
humanitarian obligations against the needs of ÔsecurityÕ, Ôsocietal cohesionÕ and Ôburden 
sharingÕ. The article argues that the European response to the refugee crisis exposes internal 
contradictions and limitations in liberal humanitarianism more broadly, as well as 
fundamental problems with R2P even amongst those countries which champion the principle. 
Theoretically, the paper draws upon debates about securitization, humanitarian norms, and 
liberal politics. Empirically, the paper analyses elite discourse and policy decisions within 
Europe, as well as UN statistical data on forced migration. 
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Introduction 
 
Does a commitment to the international ÔResponsibility to ProtectÕ principle (R2P) 
entail a commitment to protect individuals fleeing persecution, including atrocities? 
What limits to the grant of asylum by liberal states are morally consistent with their 
humanitarian commitments? For some years following the establishment of the R2P 
principle in 2005, forced migration Ð and obligations towards those seeking asylum Ð 
has been approached essentially separately to R2P in policy and academic circles. 
However, the refugee ÔcrisisÕ of 2014-15 brought two related themes to the top of the 
R2P debate in Europe Ð with global implications Ð and these will be explored in this 
paper. Firstly, the paper will consider if a credible commitment to R2P implies a 
responsibility to assist and protect civilians fleeing situations of war crimes, genocide, 
crimes against humanity or ethnic cleansing. Secondly, it will explore if the response 
of West European states to forced migration from war-torn societies exposes a 
limitation in Ð or conditions upon Ð their commitment to international protection and 
the R2P. The paper does not seek to establish whether the European response has 
been objectively ÔwrongÕ, but rather Ð in the tradition of internal critique Ð it assesses 
this response in light of EuropeÕs own moral logic. 
 
The paper argues that the European responses to the refugee crisis in 2014-15 are a 
reasonable test of the credibility of European states as champions of R2P and 
humanitarianism more broadly. From this perspective the response exposed the 
limitations and internal inconsistencies of liberal humanitarianism, both in terms of 
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policy decisions and in terms of the political discourse which framed the nature of the 
issue. By prioritizing constructions of ÔsecurityÕ, Ôsocietal cohesionÕ and Ôburden 
sharingÕ over humanitarian obligations, most European states are therefore arguably 
failing to live up to their own demanding cosmopolitan commitments. In turn, this 
demonstrates that R2P has limitations even amongst those countries which most 
rigorously champion the principle. These limitations are particularly acute when 
extending protection to vulnerable people brings political costs Ôat homeÕ and when 
the public debate about whether to accept refugees Ð and how many Ð is ÔsecuritizedÕ. 
The crisis thus demonstrated that the liberal vision of R2P is Ð despite the 
cosmopolitan rhetoric that often accompanies it Ð in practice largely confined to 
addressing humanitarian challenges externally, at a distance. This suggests that the 
traction of R2P will continue to have severe limitations when it is most needed. 
 
The empirical basis of this argument will demonstrate how the liberal response to the 
refugee ÔcrisisÕ reflects a process of securitization, a seemingly prevalent phenomenon 
in contemporary liberal societies. According to this logic, refugee movements are 
framed and treated as a security challenge, rather than as a humanitarian issue. This is 
underpinned by a discourse of existential threat, risk, emergency, zero-sum politics, 
and governance through fear and exclusion. The Òpolitics of securityÓ
1
 is reflected 
most conspicuously in the association between refugees and terrorism and crime but it 
also points to societal anxieties around values and identities which have been 
amplified in recent years. In this way, the political climate of liberal Ôsecurity 
societiesÕ demonstrates how the ethics of security are contested since different Ð and 
sometimes equally legitimate Ð claims to security are framed as being incompatible. 
The paper builds upon existing work on the securitization of migration by considering 
its implications for the humanitarian responsibilities of liberal states globally. In turn, 
it goes beyond this existing work by drawing out links between securitization debates 
and political theory, underpinned by empirical evidence drawn from elite discourse 
and practice. 
 
R2P and responsibilities to populations fleeing persecution 
 
The R2P principle was established in 2005 as an agreement amongst all UN member 
states to prevent atrocities, and to respond to the perpetration of atrocities when states 
are unwilling or unable to do so.
2
 The origins of the R2P principle are closely linked 
to forced displacement and human protection. The concept of Ôsovereignty as 
responsibilityÕ Ð the theoretical foundation of R2P Ð emerged in the 1990s as a 
response to the protection gap suffered by internally displaced populations.
3
 Clearly, 
the four situations covered by R2P Ð genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity 
and ethnic cleansing Ð invariably force people into flight; with ethnic cleansing, this is 
the primary objective. Forced displacement is also often an indicator of the potential 
or actual perpetration of these atrocities. The Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement which seek to frame state action in this area are, therefore, related to the 
principle that states have a responsibility to protect populations; if they are unwilling 
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or unable to do so, that responsibility passes to the international community.
4
 
Moreover, even before R2P was developed as a principle, UNHCR had responded to 
conflict and forced migration challenges Ð notably in the 1990s Ð under the theme of 
protection, expanding its mandate to protect people fleeing violent conflict. 
 
Some scholars have suggested that a commitment to R2P brings with it a general 
responsibility to protect those fleeing from atrocities.
5
 Souter argues that this is also a 
special moral responsibility for some countries if they contributed to the situation Ð 
such as armed conflict Ð which caused forced migrants to flee.
6
 From these 
perspectives, the protection of those fleeing from atrocities is one of the most direct 
ways of serving the R2P principle by countries which are capable of doing so. In turn, 
a denial of some form of protection Ð including forcible return to an unsafe region Ð 
would appear to be a failure to uphold the R2P commitment. There is also arguably a 
special liberal commitment to offer some degree of protection to forcibly displaced 
populations which is relevant to EuropeÕs response to the 2014-15 refugee crisis, 
because these countries have tended to be champions of the R2P principle and thus 
explicitly commit themselves to a higher standard of humanitarianism. Therefore, this 
article begins with the claim that the international commitment to R2P is relevant to 
forced displacement and that, in acute circumstances, it implies a responsibility to 
protect those fleeing atrocities when other forms of atrocity prevention are not 
effective. Furthermore, the record of countries Ð both individually and collectively Ð 
in fulfilling this aspect of R2P is a reasonable test of their humanitarian credentials 
more broadly. The R2P principle is relevant to this framework because it pertains to 
acute situations Ð which the 2015 refugee crisis was Ð and because European 
countries were so active in the establishment of the principle. 
 
However, in practice the conceptual link between R2P and forced migration has not 
substantively developed. This is partly a consequence of a sensitivity in the 
humanitarian community towards R2P due to the controversy that surrounds the 
principle,
7
 but also because of the narrow interpretation of R2P that has evolved.
8
 
There have often been doubts about whether forced migration meets the threshold of 
R2P atrocities, whether R2P brings any added value to the challenge of forced 
displacement, and if R2P should be reserved for only the most egregious violations of 
human rights (rather than people who are fleeing from such violations).  
 
In fact, a review of the landmark R2P texts and agreements illustrates a growing gap 
between R2P and forced displacement in policy terms. The report of the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty indicated that forced expulsion 
and ethnic cleansing should form one of the just cause thresholds for military 
intervention for human protection purposes, and this was supported by the report of 
the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, as well as the UN 
Secretary-GeneralÕs report, In Larger Freedom.
9
 ÔEthnic cleansingÕ Ð as a form of 
forced displacement Ð is also specified as one of the atrocity crimes relevant to R2P in 
the World Summit outcome document, alongside genocide, war crimes and crimes 
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against humanity.
10
 
 
However, the obvious link between R2P and forced migration has not been at the 
heart of developments following the 2005 world summit. The UN Secretary-GeneralÕs 
follow-up report, ÔImplementing the Responsibility to ProtectÕ, observed that Ògrants 
of asylum and protecting refugees has served numerous potential victims of crimes 
and violations relating to the responsibility to protectÓ (para. 35), and it indicated that 
Ògoals relating to the responsibility to protectÓ include the protection of refugees and 
the internally displaced (para. 68).
11
 However, there is no explicit statement that the 
granting of asylum is a part of the protection responsibilities of states by way of their 
commitment to R2P. 
 
The second major report of the UN Secretary-General, ÔResponsibility to Protect Ð 
Timely and Decisive ResponseÕ, simply observed that ÒStates contribute to the 
prevention of these crimes and violations by ensuring the granting of asylum and 
refraining from refoulement of persons fleeing violenceÉwhen appropriate.Ó
12
 
Similarly, the Secretary-GeneralÕs report on State Responsibility and Prevention 
observed that ÒThe responsibility to protect is consistent with existing obligations 
under international human rights, humanitarian and refugee law, which are binding on 
all StatesÓ.
13
  The report on international assistance and R2P observed that UNHCR, 
in collaboration with others, Òcan offer concrete forms of protection by supporting 
requests for asylum or protecting refugees in safe facilitiesÓ but nothing explicitly 
about the responsibility of individual states.
14
 
 
In the Secretary-GeneralÕs 2015 report, once again, the link between R2P and state 
responsibilities to protect people fleeing danger is tenuous.
15
 Moreover, the UNÕs 
ÔFramework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes: A tool for preventionÕ makes no 
mention of asylum, non-refoulement, or the settlement of refugees; its only allusion to 
refugees is in a passage in which it indicates that a range of UN agencies may be 
relevant to R2P, including UNHCR.
16
 
 
Thus, the links between the R2P and forced displacement have generally not been 
explicitly interpreted in UN circles as a responsibility to offer protection Ð including 
asylum Ð to those fleeing persecution or atrocities. Of course, all signatories to 
relevant international legal instruments Ð notably the 1951 Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Ð have responsibilities to people fleeing 
persecution, and this is not changed by their commitment to the R2P principle in 
2005. Nevertheless, the scarcity of references to asylum, refugee protection and non-
refoulement in the key international R2P texts seems to be a conspicuous omission Ð 
and quite possibly a conscious decoupling to allay political sensitivities. Given that 
the global normative realm has been slow to develop a concrete link between R2P and 
commitments to forcibly displaced persons Ð but also not precluded this development 
Ð it is left to national and regional actors to interpret or contest the linkage.  
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In the European context it is interesting that a keynote report of the European 
Parliament on R2P does not refer to asylum or forcible displacement, and only once 
makes a reference to refugees in connection with broader commitments to 
international law.
17
 In turn, a key European Commission position paper on ÔA 
European Agenda on MigrationÕ, produced in response to the refugee crisis, made no 
mention of R2P in framing the EU response to the millions of forcibly displaced 
persons.
18
 What this section demonstrates, before exploring the European response to 
the refugee ÔcrisisÕ, is that the intergovernmental apparatus which frames 
humanitarian response obstructs linkages between asylum and protection 
responsibilities. 
 
The liberal state response to forced displacement 
 
An analysis of EuropeÕs humanitarian practices begins with a consideration of the 
regionÕs collective humanitarian identity, and part of the background to this is found 
in the controversial Ônormative powerÕ concept. According to this, on the basis of the 
European UnionÕs constitutive principles, certain values are internalized within 
European society and projected externally.
19
 In particular, peace, freedom, 
democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights have become foundational 
and indivisible to the collective European identity, and in turn provide a normative 
worldview which has an impact externally through European external policy and 
through various forms of diffusion.
20
 These values not only constitute the European 
identity, but in theory they contribute to a worldview that guides EuropeÕs interaction 
with external partners Ð for example, in promoting and supporting democracy, human 
rights, and good governance Ð and represent a standard of practice for those who wish 
to do business with Europe. From this perspective EuropeÕs role as a global actor Ð in 
theory Ð takes into account not only the interests of Europe and European states, but a 
cosmopolitan commitment to certain standards of human welfare globally. 
 
The idea of the normative power of Europe has been challenged on many fronts.
21
 
The internal diversity of the European Union, after waves of enlargement, reflects a 
wide range of values and interests which defies the idea of a fixed, coherent value 
system. Many scholars have also raised concerns about the legitimacy of the concept, 
if it assumes the superiority of European values over ÔotherÕ systems of justice and 
politics which it seeks to ÔcivilizeÕ.
22
 In turn, other scholars have raised concerns 
about the lack of consistency between the EUÕs normative principles and its external 
policies.
23
 In practice, there have been major internal tensions and constraints attached 
to the EUÕs normative worldview, especially when dealing with great powers and 
when key interests such as energy and security are at stake. A key critique is that 
norms are more likely to play a role in EU external action when they do not conflict 
with other more conventional and self-interested policy goals and when the EU is 
dealing with relatively weak countries and regions. 
 
As this debate has evolved it has generated more reflective, sometimes self-critical, 
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viewpoints on EuropeÕs normative contribution to international order, which has 
acknowledged the limitations and constraints of the EUÕs foreign policy more 
broadly. This has been underscored in policy terms by the experience of the EU as it 
has become engaged in sensitive foreign policy challenges Ð in Libya, Iraq, Syria and 
Ukraine, amongst other cases. Nevertheless, the credibility of the EUÕs global role is 
still projected on the basis of its moral leadership and humanitarian credentials by 
European foreign policy elites, including its commitment to principles such as R2P.
24
 
 
Against this background, an examination of EuropeÕs collective response to the 
refugee ÔcrisisÕ provides an instructive case for evaluating whether these states view 
their commitment towards the R2P principle as entailing obligations to people fleeing 
grave human rights abuse. It also arguably tests the humanitarian commitments of 
liberal states more broadly, especially when challenges and responses are politically 
controversial at home. The analysis will approach this by exploring elite discourse Ð 
in particular, how states frame the refugee ÔchallengeÕ and their role in it Ð and policy 
responses. This approach is not meant to capture the range of national policy 
responses across Europe, which is beyond the scope of this paper, but instead presents 
the essential features and tone of the collective response. 
 
Some sensitivity is required when discussing the extent of the refugee challenge in 
Europe in 2014-15, because the political narrative about this issue is defined by 
assumptions about the scale of the refugee numbers. The general assumption is that 
these numbers are objectively very large, on a scale not seen since during and 
immediately after the Second World War. This narrative of absolute scale Ð as an 
ÔunprecedentedÕ challenge, an ÔemergencyÕ and a ÔcrisisÕ for Europe Ð frames the 
political debate about the issue and justifies certain policy responses, but the narrative 
should not be accepted uncritically. In fact, this framing is in some ways a subjective 
construction, and some observers have argued that while the issue may be a political 
crisis, it is not unmanageable in terms of refugee numbers, given the capacity of 
European states.
25
 Nevertheless, the numbers are impressive. In 2015, over one 
million people arrived by sea across the Mediterranean, with the majority landing into 
Greece (797,500) and Italy (149,000). Over 3600 died during their journey. 
Approximately 50% of arrivals were from Syria, 20% from Afghanistan, and 7% 
from Iraq. 90% of arrivals came from the worldÕs top 10 refugee-producing 
countries.
26
 Sea arrivals in 2014 and in particular 2015 reflected a dramatic increase, 
after remaining fairly stable between 2008 and 2013.
27
 Numbers of asylum 
applications received in 2015 across Europe broke the previous record high, set in 
1992 following the break-up of Yugoslavia. The increase in numbers of land and sea 
arrivals was a result primarily of the intensity of conflict in Syria, Afghanistan and 
Iraq, and the successful efforts of West European states to reduce arrivals by asylum 
seekers by air and regular land transit. Pull factors Ð such as GermanyÕs well-
publicized open policy towards refugees Ð may have also played a role. 
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The European ÔcrisisÕ has occurred in the context of unprecedented levels of forced 
displacement globally, with 65.3 million individuals in this position by the end of 
2015, including 21.3 million refugees and 40.8 million internally displaced persons.
28
 
2015 also saw historically low levels of refugee returns.
29
 Guterres, the former UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees, stated that ÒWe are witnessing a paradigm change, 
an unchecked slide into an era in which the scale of global forced displacement as 
well as the response required is now clearly dwarfing anything seen beforeÓ.
30
 
Globally, in addition to the unprecedented absolute numbers of forcibly displaced 
persons, the rate of increase has also been remarkable. As Betts has observed, Òthe 
refugee regime is at a crossroadsÓ and state commitment to asylum seems to be 
increasingly conditional.
31
 
 
Characterising the European response 
 
Political conflict over collective action 
There has been significant political conflict across Europe with respect to managing 
the arrival and transit of refugees, the determination of their status, and their 
(re)settlement or return. From this perspective, the crisis is a political one related to 
European cooperation and collective action rather than a crisis of human insecurity. A 
number of countries erected legal and sometimes physical boundaries at their borders 
with other European countries, constituting a breakdown Ð at least on a temporary 
basis Ð of the Schengen Agreement and a return to ÔnationalÕ approaches, laid bare by 
the Schengen Review Summit in November 2015.
32
 By the end of 2015 six members 
of the Schengen agreement had re-introduced border checks and serious questions 
were being raised as to whether the agreement would be viable for the future. This 
also represented a breakdown of the Common European Asylum System Ð covering 
reception procedures and agreements on who qualifies for international protection Ð 
and the Dublin Convention on first country of arrival. In 2014, five EU member 
countries dealt with 72% of all asylum applications across the EU.
33
 As the 
Commission noted, some EU members were failing to make a contribution to global 
resettlement efforts in terms of receiving and accepting refugees or helping to fund 
the efforts of others.
34
 This Òfragmentation of the asylum systemÓ has, according to 
the Commission, exposed a lack of trust amongst European countries.
35
 Nevertheless, 
the scale of irregular movement was apparently something that existing collective 
provisions could not accommodate. For example, given the route of arrival for most 
refugees, the Dublin Convention placed an unfair burden upon Greece and Italy due 
to their geographic location and this has formed part of the argument in favour of a 
European wide quota system. 
 
National responses to incoming refugees in 2014-15 also reflected a lack of 
cooperation within Europe in terms of easing pressure on Ð and providing resources to 
Ð those countries which were seeing the biggest influx. In a number of cases states 
unilaterally erected physical boundaries and closed borders despite this displacing 
migrant flows elsewhere. The key themes of this political conflict concerned whether 
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countries of first arrival should allow onward transit, the question of who would meet 
the costs of those frontier countries which were receiving the influx of refugees, and 
the longer term solution for distributing asylum seekers in the region. The existing 
basis for managing such challenges Ð the 2008 European Pact on Migration, 
negotiated around the concept of burden sharing Ð proved to be inadequate in the face 
of the political crisis. Yet the idea of compulsory EU quotas of refugees under a 
Ôpermanent mechanismÕ was equally controversial due to disagreements over burden 
sharing. The principal issues within this debate have concerned the sharing of costs 
and political risks, and the need for stricter policing of the EUÕs external borders in 
the interests of salvaging internal freedom of movement. 
 
Political framing of ÔcrisisÕ 
The conflict over collective action is underpinned by a political discourse of crisis, 
emergency, and even existential threat, both by supporters and opponents of more 
open policies towards refugees. Policy debates in response to refugees have reflected 
a collective action mentality geared towards sharing the ÔburdenÕ of this crisis, rather 
than moral commitments to people fleeing danger. This political framing has 
conditioned political debate within many European countries, in which forced 
displacement and asylum issues are often conflated with broader debates about 
migration, even though asylum seekers make up a small proportion of migrants, and 
refugees make up far less than 1% of EuropeÕs population. A number of nationalist 
political parties Ð such as the Swedish Democrat Party, the French Front National, and 
the UK Independence Party Ð have benefitted from and promoted this narrative and 
have in turn risen in popularity. Despite the efforts of some to claim a Ôspecial 
responsibilityÕ towards refugees,
36
 there has been little or no acknowledgement 
amongst policy elites that the Western role in conflict and instability in countries of 
origin has resulted in large refugee flows, and that this generates a responsibility 
towards them. This political framing is a key aspect of the process of securitization 
which has defined the liberal response (see below). 
 
Exclusion 
Efforts to exclude the physical arrival of all forms of irregular migrants Ð including 
those potentially fleeing grave danger Ð has characterized the European approach and 
this has been reinforced as a policy response to mass influx. A key European 
Commission position paper Ð ÔA European Agenda on MigrationÕ Ð indicated that 
ÒThe immediate imperative is the duty to protect those in needÉEurope should 
continue to be a safe haven for those fleeing persecution.Ó
37
 However, the agenda is 
underpinned by an exclusionary strategy, and it reflects a movement away from 
settlement solutions Ð compared, for example, to the 1990s with refugees from the 
Balkans. The strengthening of frontier defence, processing asylum seekers offshore, 
returning refugees when their country of origin is regarded as safe through Ôsafe 
return reviewsÕ, immediate return under the Safe Country of Origin provisions, and 
giving temporary/minimum stays of protection, are all well established mechanisms 
within Europe which are being strengthened.  
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In response to the 2014-15 crisis, these measures were complemented by agreements 
with third countries to take in or prevent the onward journey of large numbers of 
refugees as a way of diverting them from Europe. A key aspect of this was a 
settlement with Turkey in March 2016 to accommodate approximately 2 million 
Syrians who were currently there Ð and thus block onward transit Ð in return for 
financial and political incentives. The renewed emphasis upon Ôsolutions in the 
regionÕ is similarly an effort to prevent asylum seekers from reaching Europe. Part of 
this interdiction effort, form the perspective of European and national authorities, is 
aimed at preventing the abuse of the asylum system Ð in 2014, 55% of asylum 
requests in Europe resulted in a negative decision
38
 Ð but it seems clearly aimed at 
preventing the arrival of migrants, including potential refugees, in general. As some 
have observed, these measures are often counterproductive as well as ethically 
questionable.
39
 Border controls create the market for smuggling, and increase the 
reliance of migrants upon smugglers, exposing them to danger and abuse. They also 
redirect migration pressure to elsewhere, which was a key factor in the 2015 refugee 
crisis. 
 
The European experience of 2014-15 has arguably reflected a continuation, or 
escalation, of a historical pattern of behavior of many liberal states, which is to 
contain refugees within unstable regions of the world and prevent them from traveling 
to the West whenever possible.
40
 It is also instructive that the European Commission 
linked migration to the EUÕs Common Security and Defence Policy missions at work 
in some African countries, thus underlining the exclusionary mindset.
41
 
 
The European Union has already had, for some time, mechanisms to prevent or 
interdict irregular migrants. The EU Border Agency, Frontex, has agreements with 
third countries which may be the origin or transit point of ÔirregularÕ migrants, 
including refugees. Interdiction operations to tackle irregular sea arrivals have also 
been an integral part of border management. European countries have bilateral 
arrangements with third countries Ð in particular on the African coast Ð to allow 
patrols aimed at stopping sea-borne migration.
42
 The broader context for this is the 
Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) and Regional Development 
and Protection Programmes which link together EU and relevant third countries in an 
attempt to manage and regulate migration. Human Rights Watch describes this as the 
European Òdefault positionÓ: preventing or discouraging people from attempting to 
travel to EU territory, combatting smuggling networks, and deporting individuals who 
do not have a right to remain in the EU.
43
 
 
The European solution reached in September 2015 aimed to relocate 160,000 refugees 
from the most affected states (such as Italy and Greece) to elsewhere in Europe over 
two years. By the end of 2015 just 0.17% of the asylum seekers (272 Syrians and 
Eritreans) had been formally relocated from these frontline countries to countries 
elsewhere in the continent.
44
 Representatives of the largest body of independent 
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experts in the United Nations human rights system issued a damning statement on the 
response of Europe to the refugee crisis. It expressed concern about the primary focus 
upon external border protection and increasing return rates of migrants; violations of 
migrantsÕ human rights including violence against asylum-seekers; arbitrary 
detention; denial of access to food, housing, sanitation and healthcare; and the use of 
racist, xenophobic and dehumanizing language against asylum-seekers and migrants 
by political leaders. According to the human rights body, this constituted a Òcomplete 
disregard for human dignityÓ.
45
 
 
The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, Franois 
Crpeau, similarly raised the alarm about European authorities Ò[b]uilding fences, 
using tear gas and other forms of violence against migrants and asylum seekers, 
detention, withholding access to basics such as shelter, food or water and using 
threatening language.Ó
46
 Zeid RaÕad Al Hussein, the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, suggested that the language surrounding the issue had descended into 
Òxenophobia and in some cases outright racismÓ, and was reminiscent of the 1938 
Evian conference, when countries refused to take in substantial numbers of Jewish 
refugees fleeing GermanyÕs annexation of Austria.
47
 Civil society groups were 
equally critical. Human Rights Watch argued that the EU deal with Turkey, 
announced in March 2016, contradicted EU principles guaranteeing the right to seek 
asylum and against collective expulsions.
48
 Mdecins Sans Frontires suspended 
operations in a major transit camp in Greece, claiming that ÒWe will not allow our 
assistance to be instrumentalized for a mass expulsion operation, and we refuse to be 
part of a system that has no regard for the humanitarian or protection needs of asylum 
seekers and migrants.Ó
49
 UNHCR also refused to be involved in Òreturns or 
detentionÓ, and the Norwegian Refugee Council also suspended operations at a Greek 
site as a result of similar objections.
50
 Rights groups argued that the Syrian crisis has 
Òhighlighted the retreat of responsibility for refugee protectionÓ in the interests of 
Ôborder protectionÕ and Ômigration managementÕ.
51
 
 
There were different practices across liberal states, and in particular a comparison 
between Germany and other European countries is important in this respect. Germany 
received approximately 1 million refugees in 2015 and, for a time, had a very open 
policy on migration. This was framed by the German government as a liberal 
humanitarian obligation, in an attempt to provide moral leadership within Europe and 
to generate and mobilize consensus within the EU to respond to the forced migration 
issue. Nevertheless, the collective European response to the refugee crisis of 2014-15 
appears to confirm Jennifer WelshÕs observation that ÒRtoP for the European Union is 
framed still very much as a foreign policy issue: i.e., as something we do ÔoutsideÕ our 
bordersÓ.
52 
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Explaining, framing and justifying limits 
 
It is not the purpose of this article to argue that the European response to the arrival of 
large numbers of refugees in 2015 was objectively ÔwrongÕ from a moral point of 
view. Rather, the purpose is to explore that response Ð both in terms of policy action 
and the narrative used by elites to justify policy Ð in order to consider its implications 
for their standing as self-professed humanitarian actors. In turn, this is presented as 
indicative of wider constraints upon humanitarianism in liberal states. The section 
above has demonstrated that the European response was in important ways not Ð apart 
from some exceptions Ð characterized by a moral commitment to vulnerable 
populations. Moreover, little or no attempt has been made at the policy level to link 
European statesÕ responsibility to refugees with their commitment to the R2P 
principle. Indeed, the overriding narrative has been one of collective action around 
Ôburden sharingÕ and managing political risk. This section will consider this response 
in the context of debates about the legitimate limits that might exist to national 
obligations to offer asylum to those in peril, in order to consider if the restrictions 
explored in the previous section can be reconciled with EuropeÕs normative self-
image. 
 
Integrative capacity is one of the most widely explored explanations for legitimate 
limits to accepting refugees.
53
 Receiving countries need to have the ability to absorb 
refugees without undue costs for citizens. From this perspective, analysts and state 
actors often refer to the capacity of public services, land space, overall population 
size, economic strength, availability of housing, and employment opportunities as 
legitimate factors which must limit numbers of incoming refugees. If asylum seekers 
are accepted in excess of capacity to manage them, it can cause local grievances and 
potentially undermine the rights to services enjoyed by citizens of the host state. Even 
theorists associated with Ôopen bordersÕ accept that the capacity of a state to absorb 
refuges should be taken into account.
54
 Capacity to integrate might also involve a 
judgment about whether a particular community of refugees would be able to 
integrate, based upon religious and cultural factors, and the past experience of the host 
country in terms of settling refugees. From this perspective, there is an explicit 
assumption that the needs and rights of citizens trump those of all migrants, including 
refugees, and also therefore that there is an inherent tension between the admission of 
refugees and the needs of citizens. 
 
Assuming that integrative capacity is a legitimate basis for limiting refugees, the 
current distribution of refugees globally can be regarded as unfair, and this raises 
questions as to whether it is a credible justification for limits in Europe. Developing 
countries, including those in conflict-affected regions, host the vast majority of 
refugees despite an apparent disadvantage in integrative capacity compared to more 
developed countries. According to UNHCRÕs Global Trends survey for 2015, 
developing regions hosted 86% of the worldÕs refugees (13.9 million people), and the 
Least Developed Countries hosted 26% (4.2 million).
55
 The top hosts in 2015 were 
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Turkey (2.5 million), Pakistan (1.6 million), Lebanon (1.1 million), Iran (979,400), 
Ethiopia (736,100), and Jordan (664,100). The highest ratio of refugees per 1,000 
host-country inhabitants in 2014 were Lebanon (232), Jordan (87), Nauru (39), Chad 
(34), Djibouti (23), South Sudan (21), Turkey (21), Mauritania (19), Sweden (15), and 
Malta (14) (UNHCR 2016b: 3). In terms of numbers of refugees in relation to 
economic performance, the 30 countries with the largest number of refugees per 
capita were all members of developing regions, and included 18 Least Developed 
Countries. 42% of the worldÕs refugees were hosted in countries whose GDP per 
capita was below USD 5,000.
56
 The overall pattern is that those countries which have 
the highest capacity to integrate refugees host a lower proportion. Despite the 
dominance of media coverage on refugees in Western societies, numbers of refugees 
are comparatively low as a proportion of population. On this basis, the current 
distribution of refugees appears to be based upon geographic proximity rather than 
capacity.
57
 Arguments in favour of exclusion based upon capacity and the protection 
of economic interests in Europe are therefore questionable, in light of numbers 
accepted by countries in developing regions. 
 
A further problem with integrative capacity as a limit is the manner in which this is 
politically framed as a competitive or zero-sum equation, in which refugees Ð and 
migration more generally Ð are assumed to have a negative impact upon society. From 
this perspective, economic stability trumps humanitarian obligation. Yet this 
assumption of competition is far from objective or unproblematic; a number of 
authoritative studies have questioned the assumption of a negative economic impact, 
or found a positive impact of immigration in advanced economies.
58
 EU economists 
concluded that Òif managed properly, the inflow of refugees will have a small 
favourable effect on growth in the short and medium termÓ,
59
 yet this is the opposite 
message to that reflected in mainstream political discourse.  
 
This competitive framing dominates public discussion of refugee and asylum politics 
in liberal societies, creating electoral pressures which make political leaders Ð even 
those who might be sympathetic to protection Ð risk averse and cautious. This 
generally reinforces an exclusionary response to refugees Ð even in times of 
humanitarian crisis Ð and in some countries it results in outright hostile policies 
towards those fleeing danger. 
 
A further consequence of political framing in liberal societies relating to integrative 
capacity concerns whether asylum seekers would ÔfitÕ in to the community to which 
they seek to migrate, or whether they might represent a threat to societal cohesion and 
identity. Here the gap between mainstream liberalism and cosmopolitanism becomes 
evident. Where cosmopolitans might question the moral legitimacy of borders in the 
interests of human solidarity and safety, liberals would generally wish to uphold the 
values of society as an essential public good, even if this means excluding people who 
have a claim to assistance. Given that many forcibly displaced people are from 
political, cultural and religious backgrounds which are different to those of liberal 
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Western societies, the challenge of assimilation and the need to preserve the values 
which define liberal societies form a key brake upon open borders. Some political 
leaders have openly resisted refugees on the basis of their cultural and religious 
background. Czech president Milos Zeman claimed that it is Òpractically impossibleÓ 
to integrate Muslim communities into European society,
60
 and Viktor Orban, the 
prime minister of Hungary, claimed that Òthe survival of our civilization and our 
culture is at stakeÓ.
61
 This sentiment is widespread in more subtle forms in the context 
of broader concerns about migration; according to the UK home secretary, in a 
keynote 2015 address, Òwhen immigration is too high, when the pace of change is too 
fast, itÕs impossible to build a cohesive societyÓ.
62
 It is notable that this discourse 
actively conflates refugees into migrations more broadly. 
 
Securitization 
All of these explanations point to an overarching theme which defines the liberal state 
response to the refugee crisis in 2014-15, and that is the securitization both of the 
political framing of the issue and the policies which follow. In this way securitizing 
actors Ð such as state agencies Ð frame or construct an issue as a security challenge in 
a way that does not reflect an objective judgment of threat, but rather as a subjective 
political process geared towards various ends.
63
 When something is defined as a 
security challenge Ð underpinned by the language of threat, danger and conflicting 
values Ð this acts as a pretext for exceptional measures, even if these measures are in 
tension with other public goods. In the case of migration, this is a common political 
device for strengthening borders and enhancing exclusionary policies.
64
 In the 2014-
15 context, public and political discourse around the refugee ÔcrisisÕ was highly 
securitized. In the most obvious manifestation, political leaders and media outlets in 
some liberal societies drew a link between Syrian asylum seekers and the threat of 
terrorism, in particular following terrorist atrocities in Europe. Refugees were also 
associated Ð sometimes erroneously Ð with increased levels of crime, including sexual 
assault. The focus on illicit human smugglers Ð rather than the rights and needs of 
vulnerable migrants Ð is a part of this narrative, which also implicitly places 
complicity upon forcibly displaced people as irregular migrants. 
The process and effects of securitization extend far beyond the perceived threat of 
political violence and crime, however. Economic competition around livelihoods, 
access to social services and healthcare, and scarce employment opportunities are 
highly securitized around a binary of incompatible indigenous and migrant interests. 
Societal cohesion Ð in the interests of maintaining liberal values Ð are also framed 
within a securitized narrative, despite the absence of systematic evidence that 
refugees pose a threat. According to this framing, irrespective of the size of the 
incoming refugee population in comparison to general population size, the cultural 
and religious backgrounds of those migrants represents a threat to the values of the 
host society. Human Rights Watch suggested that ÒBlatant Islamophobia and 
shameless demonizing of refugees have become the currency of an increasingly 
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assertive politics of intoleranceÓ.
65
 Yet this politics, even if it may be out of 
proportion to the numbers of refugees, points to societal anxiety in liberal and quasi-
liberal countries about perceived challenges to values and identity at a time of social 
dislocation. 
 
Political elites and the media have deployed this narrative as a framing device and it 
has found some traction within liberal societies. There is also evidence of public 
antipathy towards refugees in opinion surveys,
66
 although it is difficult to know if this 
is truly bottom-up or a consequence of elite and media framing Ð or indeed, a circular 
process. Thus, even in the face of quite exceptional humanitarian catastrophe, in 
practice economic, societal and border security provide a powerful narrative which 
trump moral obligations towards people fleeing extreme danger. 
 
Whilst the controversies related to refugee influx can be explained with reference to 
political factors within and between European states, it is more difficult to make a 
judgment about the legitimacy of imposing limits and whether these limits have 
consequences for the moral credibility of liberal states as humanitarian actors. 
Political theorists have been grappling with the ethics of immigration in relation to 
questions of global justice for many years and some of their debates are relevant to 
the more narrow topic of refugees.
67
 It is interesting to draw upon this scholarship to 
frame some of the ethical questions relevant to this topic, in particular in terms of the 
limits that liberal states can legitimately impose upon the admission of refugees 
fleeing grave danger, and whether these limits are consistent with their commitment 
to humanitarian values. At the radical end of the spectrum theorists of open borders 
challenge the morality of any controls, and some argue that the refugee convention is 
too narrow and should be revised to allow greater mobility.
68
 Carens concedes that 
there are limits to our obligations to refugees Ð for example, if the admission of 
refugees is in tension with public order. However, his conclusion is that liberal states 
Òalmost neverÓ have a legitimate moral reason to impose a limit: ÒIf one takes the 
moral claims of refugees seriouslyÉit is not clear why their claims to an admission 
which is necessary to protect their most basic rights should be subordinated to much 
less vital interests of members of the receiving state.Ó
69
 In other words, it is not 
reasonable for a state which has the capacity to admit refugees to deny them asylum 
even if it causes political controversy or economic burdens Ð such as those seen in 
European states in 2014-15 Ð because these can be managed. To deny asylum, then, 
would raise questions about their credibility as humanitarian actors. 
 
In contrast, Miller is representative of political theorists who emphasize the legitimate 
responsibilities and rights of states to regulate transit across their borders and to 
decide upon the immigration policy that is appropriate for them, in line with duties 
under international law.
70
 This provides a more restrictive view of what entitlements 
should be extended to refugees who are given asylum, and the options available to 
them in terms of where they enjoy protection. From this perspective, refugees do not 
automatically have equal rights as citizens, or a right to permanent settlement if their 
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country of origin returns to a state of safety. As Miller notes, ÒIdeally, then, refugee 
flows would be managed by an international body applying burden-sharing principles 
and assigning refugees to particular receiving states on that basisÓ.
71
 This may involve 
richer states paying poorer states to host refugees, and asylum seekers would not 
necessarily have a right to seek asylum in their preferred country. However, the final 
judgment as to when a host has reached its limit of refugees rests with the host state 
itself and is therefore not subject to general moral rules or judgment.
72
 
 
State practice and public discourse generally reflect this more restrictive framing: the 
response to refugees is not debated with reference to responsibilities based upon 
principles of justice, but rather a kind of charity and always mediated by the higher 
values of security, societal cohesion and integrative capacity. In turn, political elites Ð 
in the UK, for example Ð seem to be in line with MillerÕs suggestions that Òasylum 
should be regarded in principle as a short-term measure that lasts until human rights 
conditions have improved in the refugeeÕs country of originÓ.
73
 
 
Political theory debates, whilst identifying the moral parameters, do not point to 
definitive answers as to the legitimacy of liberal state responses to the refugee crisis. 
Clearly, states have responsibilities to their own citizens as well as to those seeking 
protection. This reflects a tension between moral obligation and practice. It is a 
widely accepted principle within political theory and practice Ð and one that is 
reflected in international human rights law Ð that states have moral obligations to 
provide protection to refugees. At the same time, liberal states have undertaken great 
efforts to prevent the arrival of asylum seekers (because of the obligations this 
creates) through visa controls, carrier sanctions aimed at preventing irregular travel, 
and interdiction and diversion measures at sea and elsewhere.
74
 But whilst this may be 
decried by many, this response can claim a measure of democratic legitimacy. If the 
legitimacy of a political response in liberal societies is a function of public support, 
then the move towards exclusion is arguably legitimate since it reflects public opinion 
to varying degrees. 
 
Political theory raises ample questions regarding the ethics of how states should 
respond to refugee flows, but no consensus on a ethical response. Nevertheless, there 
is a basic requirement of consistency between commitments to humanitarian 
principles Ð including R2P Ð and action in response to refugees, even when there are 
costs to states. This, surely, raises implications about the limits of humanitarianism 
that are relevant to the liberal commitment to R2P. The securitization of the debates 
means that the interests of citizens and those seeking protection are framed as 
incompatible or in conflict. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Barbour and Gorlick argue that Òthe grant of asylum is, or would be, in many cases 
the most practical, realistic and least controversial response to assisting victims of 
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mass atrocitiesÓ.
75
 However, the European experience in 2014-15 Ð which has 
implications broadly for liberal polities Ð suggests that granting any form of asylum is 
not the least controversial response, at least in terms of domestic politics; indeed, 
using armed force has generally been less controversial for some countries than 
accepting significant numbers of refugees. The public political discourse that defined 
the refugee ÔcrisisÕ has also raised the question of whether Europe can react ÔethicallyÕ 
to such challenges. Liberal societies are assumed to reflect and embrace certain values 
and commitments, but as democratic societies they can also generate illiberalism or 
sometimes extremism. Some European countries have framed their policy on Syria Ð 
including the use of armed force Ð around a narrative that has emphasized 
humanitarian imperatives and the abuses undertaken by the Syrian government and 
parts of the opposition. Yet they apparently refuse to accept that this entails a moral 
commitment to innocent civilians who are fleeing from those situations of persecution 
Ð or they impose severe limitations on the exercise of this commitment. 
 
Some analysts have argued that complete consistency in international political 
behavior is not necessary Ð and certainly not realistic Ð in order to have a positive 
humanitarian impact.
76
 According to this, we cannot expect states Ð even those which 
profess to be committed to humanitarian values Ð to always act in a way which 
demonstrates humanitarian commitment. Is it therefore right to judge the 
humanitarian credentials of liberal states and their commitment to the R2P on the 
basis of an exceptional emergency as happened in 2014-15? For a number of reasons, 
it is reasonable to make such a judgment. Liberal states claim to be at the forefront of 
the R2P principle and the international humanitarian movement, and so their behavior 
establishes certain standards regarding the extent and limits of humanitarian norms 
and policy. A case can be made that a commitment to R2P Ð in addition to other 
international instruments dealing with refugees Ð entails a responsibility to protect 
people fleeing from mortal danger, despite the failure of the UN to effectively make 
such a link. And the scale of the challenge in 2014-15 was such that it constituted a 
reasonable test of EuropeÕs commitment to humanitarian action Ð all the more so 
because of the political costs associated with granting asylum. A Ôde-securitizedÕ 
approach could make a constructive contribution at the political level, but this 
depends upon political leadership. Unfortunately, the implication of the argument in 
this paper is that securitization and the limits to humanitarianism are inherent in 
liberal societies. Indeed, even where there have been more ÔprogressiveÕ and ÔopenÕ 
approaches to refugees in Europe, the limits to humanitarianism in liberal societies are 
still visible. 
 
The implications of this for the development of the R2P principle and for the 
humanitarian commitment of liberal states more broadly are not encouraging. There 
are limitations to the humanitarian commitment of liberal states when the exercise of 
this commitment comes at a cost in terms of resources, political controversy, or 
societal values. The political process of securitization exacerbates sensitivities about 
the perceived costs of humanitarianism, with the result that the needs of local citizens 
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are seen as incompatible with Ð and take precedence over Ð the needs of those who 
are outside the polity. This points to an exclusionary tendency within liberal societies, 
based upon values and identity as well as more material concerns. As Carens 
observes, there is Òa deep conflict between what morality requires of democratic 
states with respect to the admission of refugees and what democratic states and their 
existing populations see as their interestsÓ.
77
 The European response to the refugee 
crisis of 2014-15 was characterized by a securitized, exclusionary narrative, which 
suggests that the security and well-being of host countries trumps the needs and rights 
of asylum seekers. Whilst this is not necessarily problematic in principle, given statesÕ 
primary duty is to their citizens, the manner in which many European states have 
approached their humanitarian responsibilities raises troubling questions. Despite a 
plausible case in support of linking the R2P principle with a responsibility to protect 
individuals fleeing danger, European elites have resisted such a responsibility. 
 
The limits to liberal humanitarianism have implications for the evolution of the R2P 
principle since they suggest that even champions of R2P will weigh their 
responsibility to human protection against political expediency, electoral pressures, 
and perceptions of their own societal security and integrity. This does not necessarily 
undermine R2P as a political principle from a pragmatic ethical or political 
perspective, since absolute consistency is not essential for humanitarian action to have 
value. However, if ethical consistency is a foundation, this has troubling implications 
for the credibility of liberal states as ethical actors in a changing international order, 
and for the evolution of R2P as a norm. 
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